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An Introduction to Casuistry as Case-Based Reasoning 
Casuistry, from the Latin casus meaning "a case," is a method used in 
moral theology that attempts to apply a set of general principles in specific 
cases of human conduct. It relies upon knowledge of the law and moral 
theology in so-called "real world" situations for the purposes of informing 
conscience and guiding conduct.' In practice this means considering 
morally perplexing cases "in the light of certain ethical norms or rules," 
where "a definite view of the nature of the moral life is confronted with a 
well-described real or fictional situation."2 
Casuists are skeptical of rules, rights, and theories divorced from 
history, precedent, and circumstance. Appropriate moral judgments occur, 
casuists say, through an intimate understanding of particular situations and 
the historical record of similar cases.3 The casuist looks for cases that are 
obvious examples of a principle - a case in which there is sure to be a high 
degree of agreement among most, if not all, observers. The casuist then 
moves from these clear cases to more dubious ones, ordering them by 
paradigm and analogy under some principle. Casuistry does not eschew 
principles, nor is it incompatible with them. Its nemesis may, in fact, be the 
absolutization of principles. 4 
Casuist theory typically holds that these principles of moral belief 
and knowledge evolve incrementally through reflection on specific, and 
subsequently, related cases . To support thi s thesis , casuists sometimes 
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consider an analogy to case law. When the decision of a majority of judges 
becomes authoritative in a case, their judgments are positioned to become 
authoritative for other courts hearing cases with similar facts. This is the 
doctrine of precedent. Casuists see moral authority similarly: social ethics 
develop from a social consensus formed around cases. This consensus is 
then extended to new cases by analogy to get the past cases around which 
the consensus was formed. The underlying consensus and the paradigm 
cases become enduring and authoritative sources of appeal. As a hi story of 
similar cases and similar judgments mount, more confidence is attached to 
those judgments. Eventually, a degree of moral certitude is found in the 
judgments, and the stable elements come together in the fom1 of tentative 
principles. As confidence in these generalizations increases, they are 
accepted less tentatively, and moral knowledge develops. Just as case law 
(legal rules) develops incrementally from legal decisions in cases, so the 
moral law (moral rules) develops incrementally.5 
Casuist ethicists expend much thought on the degree of probability 
or certitude required for responsible moral judgment. They do not mean 
probability in the statistical sense, but rather the likelihood of pelforming a 
morally right action in a specific case. In situations of profound moral 
importance they frequently require what they call the via tuliar, the more 
safe course. In applying this rule to practical cases - particularly in medical 
bioethics - they insist almost unanimously that when a physician is in 
doubt about the efficacy of a treatment he must choose the safer course; 
even a remote possibility that a treatment would save a life makes that 
treatment mandatory.6 Today, many medical ethicists feel that a less 
stringent rule of moral probability can be safely followed than what has 
been inherited from the old casuists. 7 The renewal of casuistic thought in 
contemporary bioethics will be the subject of this paper. 
Historical Considerations 
Although its full-blown development came much later, the roots of 
casuistry are found in the ideas and practices of three earlier cultures: the 
ideas of Greek philosophy, the judicial practices of Roman law, and the 
traditions of rabbinical debate that developed within Judaism.8 
Aristotle (384-322 BC) argued that a theoretical approach to ethics did 
not illuminate the practical problems of human conduct in specific cases 
and situations. He noted the idea of a "first principle" that is certain and 
inherently justified in science conceived on an axiomatic model. But, he 
also held that principles in ethics are deeply embedded in the concrete 
world of human social conduct. This idea was a significant starting point of 
the Greek philosophers' search for "philosophical foundation s" of ethics, 
and for "universal principles" in which the foundations might be expressed. 
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Culturally and socially, earl y Rome stood in marked contrast to fifth 
century BC Greece. They were a highly practical people with a strong 
sense of social hierarchy and respect for authority. As the Roman empire 
grew, the resulting proliferation of rules and laws led to significant changes 
in judicial practices. Two di stinct groups of issues were functionally 
differentiated. On one side are issues that can be decided by applying 
general rules, or laws, according to the maxim, "like cases are to be decided 
alike." On the other side are issues that call for di scretion or discernment, 
with an eye to particular features of each case, according to the maxim, 
"significantly different cases are to be decided differentl y." In this regard, 
Cicero ( 106-43 BC) bequeathed to hi story the first set of clearly 
formulated moral "cases." In hi s De Officiis are described a number of 
examples in which individuals are perplexed by a conflict of moral duty. 
This was the first "case book" that related a number of these dilemmas in 
order to analyze their moral logic. 
Within Rabbinic Judaism, matters requiring moral di scernment were 
resolved by di scussion of earlier opinions and using them as "landmarks" 
from which to "tri angulate" the way to resolution of the special problem. 
Historically, rabbinical debate was not only a precursor to Chri stian 
casuistry, but in fact , the two developed in parallel through the Middle 
Ages. 
The roots of Christian casuistry are found within the New Testament 
itself. An often quoted example of incipient casuistry is found in Luke 
20:2 1-22:9 
They posed thi s question to him, 'Teacher, we know that what you 
say and teach is con-ect, and you show no parti ality, but teach the 
way of God in accordance wi th the truth . Is it lawful for us to pay 
tribute to Caesar or not?" 
In the Pauline writings, examples of proto-casui stry include the 
resolution of issues such as eating sacrificial food (l Cor 8:7-13) and the 
charism of virginity (l Cor 7:8-9; 25-28) .10 
As Christianity spread throughout the world, it req uired Christian 
answers to the various questions of the day. Casuistry provided many of 
these solutions. These were preserved in the writings of the Church 
Fathers, and included topics as diverse as military service and proper dress 
for a Christian. Of particular impOltance were the writings of Tertullian 
(On Spectacles) and Augustine (On Lying). 1 1 Augustine'S two treatises on 
lying exemplify the casuistic form. He took up questions as to whether 
good intention excuses one from guilt, and whether it is wrong to tell a lie 
in jest or as a figure of speech. In his De Officiis, Ambrose addressed 
himself to the many "duties" of the believer. He sought to articulate these 
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moral responsibilities in a concrete way that presaged the works of 
casuistry that would flourish 1,300 years later. As such, Ambrose has been 
called the first of the Christian casuists.12 
Up to this point, casuistry was more a general method rather than a 
fom1al ethical model. The Scholastics, and St. Thomas Aquinas in 
particular, pursued a different path, approaching moral theology in a more 
speculative and metaphysical fashion. J:\ 
Casuistry became a central element in the life of Roman Catholicism 
with the requirement of auricular confe sion by the FOUIth Lateran Council 
in 12l5 .1~ The study of cases was motivated, in part, to facilitate the 
training of confessors in the application of the norms of the Decalogue to 
the "times, places, and person." 15 This led to the development of specific 
courses in , and manual s of, "cases of conscience" to train clerics charged 
with the pastoral duty of hearing confessions. 16 
Within the Protestant tradition , the Cambridge Puritan preacher 
William Perkins (1558-1602) presented the first sustained treatment of 
casuistry in the English language in hi s The Whole Treatise of the Cases of 
Conscience. 17 
A significant turning point came in the mid-seventeenth century - a 
time of great religious controversy throughout the Christian world. In 
paJticular, Blaise Pascal in hi s Provincial Letters (1656-1657) set out a 
vitriolic attack on the practice of casuistry in the Roman Catholic Church 
and its principal practitioners, the Jesuits. The heart of Pascal's criticism of 
Jesuit casuistry was its laxness and hypocrisy. According to Pascal: 
" ... the license which they have assumed to tamper with the most 
ho ly rules of Christian conduct amounts to a total subversion of the 
law of God." 
The casuists were hypocrites in that they pretended to be, in the midst of 
their laxness, something they were not - faithful Christians. 
Pascal's attack on casuistry had devastating effects on the practice as 
a form of moral reasoning. The term itself came to mean an unfaithful 
application of principles. Over time. casuistry, as a model of moral 
reasoning, fell out of favor except in a few particular circles within Roman 
Catholicism, Judaism, and some denominations of Protestantism. IS To this 
day, Roget's Thesaurus lists the following synonyms, among others, for 
casuistry: equivocation, mystification, word-fencing, hair-splitting, 
claptrap, mumbo-jumbo, empty-talk, quibbling, chicanelY, subtelfuge, and 
COp-OUI. 
Notwithstanding the above, St. Alphonsus Liguori 's (1696-1787) 
more balanced approach reestablished the usefulness of the method. He 
developed a principle in casuistry known as equi-probabilism, whereby a 
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person could avoid the seeming obligation of a law only on condition that 
the contrary position was at least as probable. With such modifications, the 
casuistric approach has characterized Catholic moral theology, to some 
degree, until the Second Vatican Council. 19 
In the last thirty years with the emergence of the field of secular 
bioethics and the prominence of concrete moral dilemmas and controversies 
in moral philosophy, the theoretical models have proven to be inept in 
resolving such controversies and dilemmas in a secular world. One 
response to the particular dilemmas of medicine has been the attempt to 
develop a casuistry for bioethics. 20 
Casuistry on Contemporary Bioethics 
Bioethics, following the history of modern moral philosophy, has 
made use of different moral theories to resolve bioethical disputes.21 One 
conceptual difficulty in the use of moral theory is the difficulty of 
justifying the basis of one theory over and against other approaches such as 
utilitarianism and deontology. 22 A second conceptual issue is that any 
theory requires a particular moral commjtment or set of moral values in 
order to reach solutions to the dilemma.23 Moral theorists have become 
mired in disputes about both the foundations and values which should be 
used in developing a moral theory. 
In the absence of a unified moral theory for resolving dilemmas in 
applied ethics a number of strategies have emerged to meet the challenges 
of moral pluralism. One of the strategies which seeks to avoid the 
dilemmas of moral theory is the effort to revive the practice of casuistry.24 
In spite of casuistry'S tarnished reputation, some philosophers have 
claimed that casuistry, stripped of its unfortunate excesses, has much to 
teach us about the resolution of moral problems in medicine.25 This "new 
casuistry" could appropriately be viewed, not so much as a rival to the 
applied ethics model, but rather as a necessary complement to any and all 
moral theories that would guide our conduct in specific situations .26 In 
contrast to methods that begin from "on high" with the working out of a 
moral theory and culminate in the deductive application of norms to 
particular situations, this new casuistry works from the "bottom up", 
emphasizing practical problem solving by means of nuanced interpretation 
of individual casesY Instead of focusing on the need to fit principles to 
cases, this interpretation stresses the particular nature, derivations, and 
function of the principles manipulated by the new casuists. Through this 
alternative theory of principles, we begin to discern a morality that 
develops, not from the top down as in most interpretations of Roman law, 
but rather from case to case (or from the bottom up) as in the common law. 
What differentiates the new casuistry from applied ethics, then, is not the 
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mere recognition that principles must eventually be applied, but rather a 
particular account of the logic and derivation of the principles that we use 
in moral discourse. 28 
Thus, in the practice of casuistry, properly understood, a 
comprehensive ethical theory does not precede , but follows the study of 
particular cases - though it is surely true that moral problems are construed 
around "an already perceived but, as yet, inarticulate moral notion" 
exemplified by particular cases.29 
Thi s focus suggests that casuistry and clinical ethics consultation are 
very much the same - both are forms of reasoning directed toward practical 
resolutions that lead to decisions and to practical actions. 
Consider how the casuist might approach the case of the father 's 
refusal to become a donor. The casuist would begi n by identify ing 
particular features in the case rather than appealing to uni versal principles, 
utilitarian calculations, or lights. The casuist would then attempt to identify 
the relevant precedents and prior experiences with other cases, attempting 
to determine how similar and different thi s case is from experiences with 
other cases. In assessing what the father should do, the casuist would 
determine whether we typically insist, in relevantly similar cases, that 
parents bear comparable inconvenience and risk to offer their children some 
chance of survival. In detel111ining what the physician should do, analogous 
cases would be considered in which breaches of confidentiality are justified or 
unjustified. The objective is to act in li ght of any strong social consensus 
found in precedent cases in medicine and law. Such cases would indicate, 
for example, that physicians have a right and sometimes an obligation to 
breach confidentiality in order to prevent harm to others. Examples of 
these cases include repOiting gunshot wounds and venereal diseases, and in 
some contexts, warning intended victims of a patient's threatened violence. 
The casuist might also ask whether the father 's refusal to donate 
would cause a hann to hi s daughter or would only fail to benefit her and 
whether a threatened or actual breach of confidentiality might be justified 
in an effort to force him to donate. Similarly the casuist would ask whether 
a lie ("the father is not hi stocompatible") or a milder form of deception 
("for medical reasons the father should not donate") could be justified to 
prevent wrecking the family. The casuist would attempt to answer these 
questions by appeal to maxims grounded in experience and tradition, as 
well as by reasoning from analogous cases. 
Conclusion 
Today 's casuists have reminded us of the importance of analogical 
reasoning, paradigm cases, and practical judgment. Biomedical ethics, 
like ethical theory, may have unduly minimized thi s approach to moral 
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knowledge. Casui sts have also rightly pointed out that generalizations are 
often best learned, accommodated, and implemented by using cases, case 
discussion, and case methods. These insights can be utilized by connecting 
them to an appropriate set of concepts, principles, and theories that control 
the selection and analysis of cases. Biomedical ethics has long been driven 
by two kinds of analysis: case study and ethical theory. Cases such as 
Quinlan. Bouvia, and Baby M are discussed across the literature of the 
field, form a shared resource, and become integral to the way we think and 
draw conclusions. They profoundly influence our standards of fairness, 
negligence, paternali sm, and the like. A proper account of moral judgment 
is critical for biomedical ethics, which cannot flouri sh without a link 
between theory, principles, and decision-making. Sensitivity to context 
and individual differences is essential for a di scerning use of principles. 
Casui stry is notable for no other reason than its long history of attempting 
to deal with this problem. 3D 
Finally casuistry, as a formal ethical model - and within its hi storic 
context, developed within a culture where there was a consensus on certain 
moral values and principles (the Decalogue and the teachings of Christ, as 
an example). Within Catholic moral theology, casuistry functioned within 
the context of a common belief in God, the destiny of humankind, the 
acceptance of the principles of double effect, of totality, and the theory of 
probabili sm. 31 Unfortunately, in contemporary applied ethics, such as 
hospital ethics committees, there is rarely a consensus on principles. This 
appears to be true even among groups that one might believe to be alike in 
their be liefs, such as Roman Catholicism, or even Christianity in general. 
The greatest weakness of casuistry in contemporary bioethics would 
appear to be the very nature of our plurali stic society with its lack of 
universally accepted values and principles. This, of course, is made worse 
by the ever-widening rift between religious and secular society. 
Casuistry, it would appear, may function well as a method of case 
analysis, but there is legitimate concern as to whether it can be a reliable 
theory of bioethics in practice. 
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